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far in excess of the policy limits might be 
entered against Campbell; and State Farm 
did not warn the Campbells that they 
would be jointly and severally liable for the 
entire judgment even if Campbell were 
found only partially at fault. Rather, State 
Farm falsely assured the Campbells there 
was no evidence against Campbell and no 
danger of exposure beyond their policy lim-
its. Moreover, the Campbells allege that 
State Farm affirmatively acted to deceive 
them by destroying Summers' candid re-
port of his evaluation of the case against 
Campbell. Finally, after the trial, State 
Farm completely disclaimed any responsi-
bility for the excess judgment, instead, 
through counsel, advising its aged, retired 
insureds to put a "for sale" sign on their 
farm. 
State Farm points out that Mr. Campbell 
allegedly insisted he was not to blame for 
the accident and that this at least partially 
explains State Farm's decision to go to 
trial. The insured's demand (or lack there-
of) that the case be settled certainly is 
relevant to a determination whether the 
insurer wrongfully refused to settle. How-
ever, Mr. Campbell alleges that he was not 
properly apprised of the strength of the 
case against him and the likelihood of a 
large excess judgment being entered 
against him. These are material issues of 
fact which must be resolved by the trier of 
fact upon remand. 
Viewing these disputed facts in the light 
most favorable to the Campbells, as we 
must, we think that a jury could reasonably 
conclude that State Farm violated the im-
plied duty of good faith it owed to the 
Campbells. Thus, the Campbells are enti-
tled to an opportunity to prove that State 
Farm acted in bad faith and that, as a 
24. Of course we hold only that the Campbells 
are entitled to an opportunity to prove they are 
entitled to such damages; we do not hold they 
have done so. Punitive damages require con-
duct that is willful and malicious, or manifest-
ing a knowing and reckless indifference and 
disregard toward the rights of others. See, e.g., 
Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah 
1988). 
25. One author discussing damages for bad faith 
failure to settle a third-party claim notes that in 
very few cases have insureds recovered damages 
result, they suffered damages, including 
emotional distress, proximately caused by 
State Farm's alleged breach, and to prove 
they are entitled to punitive damages.24 
Accordingly, while State Farm's subse-
quent payment of the excess judgment may 
have served to mitigate the damages flow-
ing from its alleged bad faith conduct, it 
does not nullify the Campbells' bad faith 
cause of action.25 
II. AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE 
CAMPBELLS, THE OSPITALS, 
AND SLUSHER 
[10] State Farm also argues the Camp-
bells' bad faith claim should be barred by 
the agreement the Campbells made with 
the Ospitals and Slusher.28 We disagree. 
Like State Farm's eventual payment of the 
excess judgment, the agreement irisulating 
the Campbells from liability for payment of 
the judgment does not cure the alleged bad 
faith conduct of State Farm. However, the 
agreement is certainly relevant to the 
Campbells' damages. Insofar as this 
agreement served to ease the Campbells' 
minds, it may have lessened the extent of 
their claimed emotional distress. However, 
a fair amount of time passed between the 
entry of the excess judgment against 
Campbell and finalization of the agree-
ment, during which time the Campbells 
may have continued to suffer emotional 
upset. Thus, the Campbells assert that the 
agreement's effect on their claimed emo-
tional distress is an issue for the factfinder 
to weigh. Like State Farm's eventual pay-
ment of the judgment, the existence of this 
agreement does not necessarily vitiate the 
Campbells' cause of action. 
beyond the amount of the excess judgment it-
self. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Distributing Risk 
192 (1986). Be that as it may, that fact does not 
undermine our decision that, as a matter of law, 
an insured may state a bad faith claim though 
the insurer has paid the excess judgment. We 
leave the difficulties of proof relating to the 
insurer's conduct and the insured's damages to 
the Campbells and the trier of fact. 
26. See supra note 8. 
BROWN v. RICHARDS 
Cite at 840 P.2d 143 (Utah App. 1992) 
ill. THE CAMPBELLS' OTHER 
CAUSES OF ACTION 
Utah 143 
[111 In addition to the Campbells' claim 
that State Farm breached the implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing, they 
claim State Farm's conduct also gave rise 
to other causes of action, including breach 
of fiduciary duty, fraudulent misrepresen-
tation, and intentional infliction of emotion-
al distress. As State Farm has pointed 
out, all of the Campbells' claims are de-
rived from the same conduct: State Farm's 
failure to settle the case within the policy 
limits. Because we have concluded that 
the actionable wrong is the failure to set-
tle, not the failure to pay the resulting 
judgment and, thus, that the Campbells 
have a cause of action for breach of the 
covenant of good faith, the Campbells are 
entitled to an opportunity to pursue their 
other causes of action stemming from the 
same allegedly wrongful conduct.27 
CONCLUSION 
The Campbells are entitled to pursue a 
cause of action against State Farm for 
breach of the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing, based on State Farm's alleged-
ly unreasonable refusal to settle the case 
against them within policy limits, notwith-
standing the fact that State Farm paid the 
resulting excess judgment years later, af-
ter its affirmance on appeal. The Camp-
bells are likewise entitled to an opportunity 
to pursue their additional claims arising 
from the same allegedly wrongful conduct. 
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for 
trial or other appropriate proceedings con-
sistent with this opinion. 
BENCH and GREENWOOD, JJ., concur. 
KWUM> 
27. We decline to address State Farm's argument 
that Mrs. Campbell lacks standing to pursue 
these claims, finding it to be without merit. 
Furthermore, in view of our resolution of the 
Boyd J. BROWN, an individual, and In-
terwest Aviation Corporation, Plain-
tiffs, Counter-Defendants, Appellees, 
and Cross-Appellants, 
David K. RICHARDS, an individual, and 
David K. Richards & Company, Defen-
dants, Counter-Plaintiffs, Appellants, 
and Cross-Appellees. 
No. 900639-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Aug. 24, 1992. 
Seller brought action against buyer to 
enforce purchase agreement, and buyer 
brought counterclaim against seller for 
fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach 
of warranty, and breach of fiduciary duty. 
The District Court, Salt Lake County, Ken-
neth Rigtrup, J., entered judgment for both 
seller on contract claim and buyer on other 
claims, and buyer appealed, and seller 
cross-appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Bench, P.J., held that: (1) parol evidence 
was inadmissible to establish that buyer 
agreed to increased purchase price of cor-
poration if it did not exercise option to 
purchase building; (2) buyer relied on sell-
er's fraudulent statements, even though he 
may have discovered truth about misrepre-
sentations before exercising options; (3) 
buyer was not entitled to collect fraud 
award and retain ownership of corporation 
without making further payments under 
executory contract; (4) seller was only enti-
tled to interest on purchase price adjusted 
for fraud damages, not full purchase price; 
(5) trial court improperly denied breach of 
warranty damages; (6) seller breached fi-
duciary duty to buyer when they were 
jointly operating corporation and buyer 
was damaged; (7) both buyer and seller 
were entitled to attorney fees as prevailing 
parties in disputes concerning different 
contracts; (8) buyer was prevailing party, 
primary issue in this case, the Campbells' argu-
ment that they needed additional time for dis-
covery need not be addressed. 
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though he received only portion of dam-
ages he was seeking; and (9) trial court 
improperly awarded attorney fees without 
adequately setting forth its analysis for 
award. 
Reversed and remanded in part and 
affirmed in part. 
1. Corporations <5='116 
Parties did not agree to increase pur-
chase price of corporation if buyer did not 
exercise option to purchase property, 
where final version of contract did not con-
tain provision to increase purchase price, 
and contract contained integration clause 
that agreement and exhibits constituted en-
tire agreement between parties. 
2. Evidence <s=»384 
Parol evidence may not be used to vary 
express terms of agreement. 
3. Fraud e=>23 
Buyer reasonably relied upon seller's 
misrepresentations, though buyer exercised 
his options to purchase remainder of corpo-
ration and property after he had access to 
true financial condition of corporation as 
co-owner; it may have been reasonable for 
buyer to protect his initial investments by 
exercising options, even if he had discover-
ed truth about misrepresentations before 
exercising them. 
4. Appeal and Error <3=>999(1) 
Jury verdicts are entitled to great def-
erence on appeal. 
5. Appeal and Error <S=>930(1), 1001(1) 
The Court of Appeals reviews the evi-
dence in the light most favorable to the 
prevailing party, and will affirm, unless in 
so doing, court must say as a matter of law 
that the evidence fails to meet the test of 
being clear and convincing. 
6. Fraud e=»61 
Willful misrepresentations by seller in 
stock purchase agreement warranted puni-
tive damages. 
7. Corporations <s=118 
Purchaser's substantial performance 
defense against seller's breach of contract 
claim did not bar seller from recovering 
under stock purchase agreement, though 
seller could not have enforced contract 
against buyer; buyer chose to enforce rath-
er than rescind contract, so as to retain 
ownership of stock, entitling seller to re-
cover under contract after adjustment for 
his lack of performance. 
8. Corporations <s=»121(7) 
Defrauded buyer who chose to retain 
stock and enforce stock purchase agree-
ment was required to offset his award 
against original purchase price, and was 
not entitled to collect award and retain 
ownership without making any further pay-
ments under agreement. 
9. Damages <s=117 
"Benefit of the bargain" damages are 
refund to purchaser of overpayment in or-
der to bring effective purchase price in line 
with actual value received. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
10. Fraud <s=»59(2) 
Where contract is executory and pur-
chase price has yet to be paid in full, cash 
award for fraud damages and forgiveness 
of any outstanding debt on contract vio-
lates goal oi benefit of bargain rule. 
11. Sales <s=189 
If defrauded buyer has not paid 
amount sufficient to satisfy adjusted pur-
chase price of contract and chooses to en-
force rather than rescind contract, buyer 
must satisfy unpaid portion in order to 
retain ownership of assets purchased under 
contract. 
12. Interest «=>56 
Seller who defrauded purchaser was 
only entitled to interest on adjusted pur-
chase price under stock purchase agree-
ment after fraud damages were offset 
from purchase price, rather than interest 
on full purchase price. 
13. Damages <£=>\5 
Trial court improperly ruled that 
breach of warranty damages for buyer un-
der purchase agreement were duplicative 
of fraud damages, where seller warranted 
BROWN v. RICHARDS 
Cite as 840 P-2d 143 (Utah App. 1992) 
that assets of corporation were in good and both parties 
serviceable condition, corporation's field 
farm was in serious disrepair, and costs of 
repairs were not included as damages un-
der fraud claim. 
14. Damages ®=104, 119 
Jury is allowed wide discretion in 
awarding damages. 
15. Damages <s=>128 
Courts must defer to jury's determina-
tion of damages unless jury disregarded 
competent evidence, award is so excessive 
beyond rational justification as to indicate 
effect of improper factors in determination, 
and award was rendered under misunder-
standing. 
16. Corporations <S=*310(1) 
Trial court properly awarded damages 
to buyer for seller's breach of fiduciary 
duty during period when seller and buyer 
were jointly operating corporation, where 
seller borrowed against line of credit for 
operational costs in breach of agreement 
that line of credit would only be used for 
purchasing airplanes for resale, and buyer 
signed personal guaranty on line of credit; 
buyer was damaged by use of line of credit 
for operational expenses when he became 
legally obligated to satisfy debt he did not 
wish to incur. 
17. Costs <$=>194.36 
Trial court properly awarded attorney 
fees to buyer as prevailing party in dispute 
concerning agreement to purchase corpora-
tion and to seller as prevailing party in 
dispute concerning agreement to purchase 
building, though seller received net judg-
ment greater than that received by buyer 
for entire transaction, where agreements 
were independent and intended to be en-
forced separately. 
18. Costs <S=>194.32 
The prevailing party on a given con-
tract may recover fees without consider-
ation of other claims in the same case aris- 26. 
ing from other contracts between the par-
ties. 
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are successful in enforcing 
different provisions of contract against the 
other. 
20. Costs «= 194.36 
Buyer was properly awarded attorney 
fees as prevailing party in suit relating to 
purchase agreement, though buyer did not 
obtain full amount of damages he was 
seeking. 
21. Costs <s=>194.14 
It is the determination of culpability, 
not amount of damages, that determines 
who is prevailing party for award of attor-
ney fees. 
22. Costs <£=>194.14 
While reduction in amount claimed by 
plaintiff may seem moral and financial vic-
tory for defendant, it does not make defen-
dant the prevailing party in terms of attor-
ney fees. 
23. Costs <s=194.36 
Seller was entitled to award of attor-
ney fees for successfully defending con-
tractual rights on contracts unrelated to 
sale of corporate assets, even if such ef-
forts were not significant portion of overall 
lawsuit. 
24. Costs <s=»208 
Trial court abuses discretion in award-
ing attorney fees to prevailing party in 
contract action without adequately setting 
forth its analysis for award in manner per-
mitting appellate review. 
25. Appeal and Error <S=984(5) 
Costs <S=194.12 
The calculation of attorney fees is in 
sound discretion of the trial court and will 
not be overturned absent showing of clear 
abuse of discretion. 
Costs <s=208 
When party is contractually entitled to 
19. Costs «=»194.32 
Even if contracts were merged into 
one, both parties are entitled to fees when 
attorney fees, trial court's findings regard-
ing those fees should be just as complete 
as its findings regarding other types of 
contractual damages. 
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27. Costs <3=>252 
When party who received attorney 
fees below prevails on appeal, party is also 
entitled to fees reasonably incurred on ap-
peal. 
Robert S. Campbell, Jr. (argued), Kevin 
Egan Anderson, Joann Shields, Campbell, 
Maack & Sessions, Elizabeth T. Dunning, 
Carolyn Cox, Watkiss, Dunning & Watkiss, 
Salt Lake City, for appellants. 
Bruce E. Coke (argued), Larry A. Kirk-
ham, Curtis C. Nesset, Nygaard, Coke & 
Vincent, Salt Lake City, for appellees. 
Before BENCH, P.J., and BILLINGS and 
GARFF, JJ. 
OPINION 
BENCH, Presiding Judge: 
Appellants, David K. Richards and David 
K. Richards & Company, (collectively 
"Richards"), appeal the trial court's judg-
ment based upon special jury interrogato-
ries regarding a commercial transaction en-
tered into between Richards and appellees, 
Boyd J. Brown and Interwest Aviation Cor-
poration, (collectively "Brown"). Brown 
cross-appeals. We affirm in part, and re-
verse and remand in par t 
BACKGROUND 
Facts 
This case arises out of a complex trans-
action where Brown, the principal share-
holder of Interwest Aviation Corporation 
(Interwest), sold his Interwest stock and 
several other assets to Richards through 
numerous agreements and options. We 
summarize the facts to include only those 
directly pertinent to our analysis. 
Interwest was a fixed-based operation 
located on the east side of the Salt Lake 
International Airport. In addition to pro-
viding services such as maintenance, refu-
eling, and de-icing, Interwest bought and 
sold aircraft and operated a charter ser-
vice. Interwest was located in a building 
1. Richards had sought rescission as an alterna-
tive remedy, but opted to seek damages follow-
owned personally by Brown (the Interwest 
Building). Brown also owned a neighbor-
ing hangar, known as the Executive Air 
Services Building (Executive Air Building). 
In simple terms, the parties agreed that 
Richards would buy fifty percent of 
Brown's stock in Interwest for $450,000; 
Richards would then have the option after 
one year to buy the remainder of the stock 
for an additional $450,000 (collectively "the 
Interwest purchase agreement"). Richards 
also purchased sixty percent of Brown's 
ownership of the Interwest Building with 
an option to purchase the remaining inter-
est after one year (collectively "the Inter-
west Building agreement"). Richards was 
also given an option to purchase the Execu-
tive Air Building. 
The parties formally memorialized their 
agreements in writing as of April 23, 1984. 
Richards eventually exercised his options 
to purchase Brown's remaining interests in 
Interwest and the Interwest Building, but 
he did not exercise the option on the Execu-
tive Air Building. 
Richards made principal and interest pay-
ments from April, 1984 to April, 1986. 
During that time, Brown and Richards 
jointly managed Interwest. Richards then 
defaulted. Brown sued Richards for his 
failure to make the payments owing on the 
Interwest purchase agreement and the In-
terwest Building agreement. Brown also 
claimed, notwithstanding the written Inter-
west purchase agreement, that the pur-
chase price of the corporation was to in-
crease by $500,000 if Richards failed to 
exercise the option to buy the Executive 
Air Building. Richards counterclaimed for 
fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach 
of warranty, and breach of fiduciary duty.1 
The matter was submitted to a jury on 
special interrogatories at the close of an 
eight-week trial. 
Jury Verdict 
In response to the special interrogato-
ries, the jury found that Brown did not 
substantially perform the agreement to sell 
ing Brown's motion for partial summary judg-
ment on the issue of election of remedies. 
BROWN v. RICHARDS 
Clle as 840 P.2d 143 (Utah App. 1992) 
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Interwest. It further found that Brown 
had defrauded Richards with regard to the 
sale of Interwest. With respect to the 
question of damages, the jury found that 
the difference between the value of Inter-
west, as misrepresented by Brown, and its 
true value, as received by Richards, was 
$500,000. The jury also awarded Richards 
$550,000 in punitive damages. 
In addition to its finding of fraud, the 
jury found that Brown had breached war-
ranties in the sale of Interwest and award-
ed Richards another $100,000 damages. 
Finally, the jury found that Brown breach-
ed fiduciary duties owed to Richards dur-
ing the period of their joint ownership of 
Interwest and awarded Richards an addi-
tional $300,000 in damages. 
Regarding the Interwest Building agree-
ment, the jury found that Brown had sub-
stantially performed the agreement to sell 
the Interwest Building and did not misre-
present the value of the building. Pursu-
ant to the special interrogatory, the jury 
found that Richards breached the Inter-
west Building agreement and awarded 
Brown $407,259 in damages. 
The question was also put to the jury 
whether Richards had agreed to pay an 
additional $500,000 for Interwest if he did 
not exercise the option on the Executive 
Air Building. The jury found that Rich-
ards had agreed to such an increase in 
price. The jury found, however, that de-
spite Richards's failure to exercise the Ex-
ecutive Air Building option, Richards did 
not breach the agreement to increase the 
purchase price and did not award Brown 
any damages. 
Trial Court's Judgment 
Richards submitted a proposed judgment 
based upon the jury's answers to the spe-
cial interrogatories, and Brown objected. 
Several hearings were held due to objec-
tions raised by Brown until the trial court 
finally entered final judgment on the spe-
cial interrogatories and its own supplemen-
tal findings. 
Despite the jury's finding that Brown did 
not substantially perform the Interwest 
purchase agreement, the trial court award-
ed Brown the contract amount plus interest 
just as if he had prevailed on his claim 
against Richards. The trial court also 
awarded Brown $500,000 plus interest on 
his claim that the purchase price of Inter-
west was to increase if Richards did not 
exercise his option on the Executive Air 
Building. 
The trial court then awarded Richards 
$500,000 plus interest on his fraud claim as 
the difference between the value of Inter-
west as represented by Brown and the 
value of the assets Richards received. 
Richards was also awarded the $550,000 
found by the jury as punitive damages. 
As to Richards's breach of warranty 
claim, the trial court ruled that the dam-
ages found by the jury were duplicative of 
the damages it found on the fraud claim. 
It therefore refused to award Richards 
$100,000 as found by the jury to be his 
damages from Brown's breach of warran-
ty. It did, however, award Richards the 
full $300,000 found by the jury to have 
been the damages resulting from Brown's 
breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court 
did not disturb the jury's findings regard-
ing Brown's damages resulting from Rich-
ards's breach of the Interwest Building 
agreement. 
Finally, the trial court awarded attorney 
fees to both parties according to the con-
tract upon which they prevailed: $435,000 
to Richards pursuant to the Interwest pur-
chase agreement, and $250,000 to Brown 
pursuant to the Interwest Building agree-
ment. 
We will identify the parties' alleged er-
rors as we consider them. The parties 
raise fifteen separate issues with many 
sub-issues and alternative arguments. We 
have fully reviewed, but do not address, 
every issue and argument raised by the 
parties. The unaddressed claims and argu-
ments are either mooted by our analysis, or 
we simply decline to address them. See 
State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888-889 
(Utah 1989) (appellate court has discretion 
as to the extent of its opinion). 
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PURCHASE PRICE 
[1,2] Richards asserts that the trial 
court erred in denying him a directed ver-
dict regarding Brown's claim that Richards 
agreed to an increased purchase price of 
Interwest if Richards did not exercise the 
Executive Air Building option. Brown 
claimed a draft of the contract provided 
that the purchase price of Interwest would 
increase, but that the provision was absent 
from the final version. Richards asserts as 
a matter of law that such parol evidence 
may not be utilized to vary the express 
terms of the agreement. We agree. 
Absent fraud or other invalidating 
clauses, the integrity of a written con-
tract is maintained by not admitting par-
ol evidence to vary or contradict the 
terms of the writing once it is deter-
mined to be an integration. It is also 
maintained by applying a rebuttable pre-
sumption that a writing which on its face 
appears to be an integrated agreement is 
what it appears to be. 
Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 665 
(Utah 1985) (footnote omitted). 
The Interwest purchase agreement spe-
cifically set forth the purchase price and 
contained the following integration clause: 
"This Agreement and the exhibits hereto 
constitute the entire agreement between 
the parties with respect to the matters 
covered herein " Brown's self-serving 
assertion that the contract was not inte-
grated because it did not contain a provi-
sion he recalled from an earlier draft is 
insufficient as a matter of law to show the 
contract was not integrated. 
[A] party may not establish a different 
contract on facts known at the time of 
reducing their understanding to written 
form. All preliminary negotiations, con-
versations, and verbal agreements are 
merged in and superseded by the subse-
quent written contract, and unless fraud, 
accident or mistake be averred, the writ-
ing constitutes the agreement between 
the parties and its terms cannot be al-
tered by parol evidence. 
Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602, 607 (Utah 
1974). 
There being no admissible parol evidence 
that the purchase price was not fully inte-
grated into the contract, Brown failed as a 
matter of law to rebut the presumption 
that the contract was integrated. Richards 
was therefore entitled to a directed verdict 
on Brown's claim that there was an agree-
ment to increase the purchase price. Bre-
hany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 57 
(Utah 1991) ("a directed verdict is appropri-
ate if, on uncontested facts and under the 
applicable law, one party is entitled to judg-
ment"). 
Since Richards was entitled to a directed 
verdict, the question should not have been 
submitted to the jury and the trial court 
subsequently erred in awarding Brown 
$500,000 in its final judgment. The con-
tract purchase price was $900,000, as ex-
pressly agreed to by the parties in writing. 
We therefore vacate the trial court's award 
of $500,000 to Brown for the purported 
increase in the contract purchase price of 
Interwest. 
FRAUD 
Sufficiency of the Evidence 
[3-5] Brown claims there was insuffi-
cient evidence of the elements of fraud and 
reliance by Richards to support the jury's 
verdict. Jury verdicts are entitled to great 
deference. We review the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the prevailing par-
ty, and will affirm "unless in so doing we 
must say as a matter of law that the evi-
dence fails to meet the test of being clear 
and convincing " Pace v. Parrish, Y12. 
Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273, 274 (1952). In 
order to challenge the jury's verdict, Brown 
"must set out in [his] brief[], with record 
references, all the evidence that supports 
the verdict, including all valid inferences to 
that effect, and demonstrate that reason-
able people would not conclude that the 
evidence supports the verdict." Hodges v. 
Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d .151, 156 
(Utah 1991). 
Richards alleged in his complaint that 
Brown made seventeen misrepresentations 
about Interwest. Brown claims that as a 
matter of law Richards could not have rea-
sonably relied upon Brown's misrepresenta-
BROWN v. RICHARDS 
Cite as 840 P.2d 143 (Utah App. 1992) 
tions when he exercised his options to pur-
chase the remainder of Interwest and the 
Interwest Building after he had access to 
the true financial condition of Interwest as 
a co-owner. A similar argument was made 
and rejected in Pace, where a buyer chose 
to enforce a real estate contract after dis-
covering the seller's fraud. The supreme 
court held that a defrauded party to an 
executory contract may "affirm the con-
tract and perform it without forfeiting his 
right to maintain an action to recover dam-
ages resulting from the deceit." Pace, 247 
P.2d at 277 (quoting 5 Williston on Con-
tracts, Rev. ed., § 1524, p. 4267). See also 
Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1247 (Utah 
1980) (a defrauded party, "who does not 
discover the fraud until he has partly per-
formed, may go forward with the contract, 
keep what he has received, and still main-
tain his action for damages"). Inasmuch 
as Richards had invested a significant 
amount in purchasing his partial shares, it 
may have been reasonable for him to pro-
tect his initial investments by exercising 
the options, even if he had discovered the 
truth about the misrepresentations before 
exercising the options. A finding of rea-
sonable reliance is therefore not precluded 
as a matter of law. 
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Evidentiary Errors 
[61 Brown also challenges the jury's 
verdict based upon alleged evidentiary er-
rors made by the trial court. As the su-
preme court has noted, "in any lawsuit of 
several days duration counsel can usually 
find matters upon which he may claim er-
ror, but this court will not reverse on mere 
error but only if it is substantial and preju-
dicial to the extent that there is a reason-
able likelihood that unfairness or injustice 
has resulted." Lamb, 525 P.2d at 610. 
Even assuming that the trial court commit-
ted the errors Brown claims, Brown has 
failed to show how the errors prejudiced 
the outcome of his case. Brown asserts 
only that the awarding of punitive damages 
evidences prejudice because, except for the 
evidence erroneously admitted, there was 
no conduct egregious enough to warrant 
punitive damages. Given the untainted evi-
dence of the willful misrepresentations 
made by Brown, we disagree. We there-
fore do not disturb the judgment. 
While Brown does raise questions about 
some of the representations, and whether 
Richards reasonably relied on some of the 
statements, he has not marshaled the evi-
dence in support of the jury verdict and 
shown why the jury could not have found 
fraud. He only cites the evidence favor-
able to his claims and reargues the evi-
dence as if at trial.2 Such an approach is 
inappropriate on appeal. Hodges, 811 P.2d 
at 156. Since Brown has failed to marshal 
the evidence and show how the jury could 
not have reasonably found fraud, we do not 
disturb the jury's finding. 
2. In replying to Richards's claim that Brown has 
failed to properly marshal the evidence, Brown 
makes the disingenuous argument that he need 
not marshal the evidence in support of the jury's 
verdict because it was so "light." He then as-
serts that the length restrictions on his brief 
prevented him from marshaling this "light" 
amount of evidence. 
Offset of Fraud Damages Against 
Purchase Price 
[7] On Brown's claims that Richards 
breached the Interwest purchase agree-
ment, the trial court awarded Brown the 
full purchase price of Interwest as if he 
had prevailed against Richards. Richards 
argues that the trial court erred in award-
ing Brown the full contract purchase price 
because Brown was barred from recover-
ing anything under the Interwest purchase 
agreement. While the trial court erred in 
portraying its final judgment as an 
"award" to Brown of the full purchase 
price, with an offsetting "award" to Rich-
ards, Richards's argument that Brown was 
barred from receiving any amount under 
the Interwest purchase agreement fails. 
Richards had asserted an equitable "sub-
stantial performance" defense against 
Brown's breach of contract claim.3 The 
3. The substantial performance defense has been 
explained as follows: "As a rule, a party first 
guilty of a substantial or material breach of 
contract cannot complain if the other party 
thereafter refuses to perform. He can neither 
insist on performance by the other party nor 
maintain an action against the other party for a 
subsequent failure to perform." Fernandez v. 
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jury found that Brown did not substantially 
perform the Interwest purchase agreement 
when it responded "no" to the following 
special interrogatory: "As the term is de-
fined in the court's instructions, [has 
Brown] substantially performed his agree-
ment to sell the assets of Interwest?" Ac-
cording to Richards, the jury's negative 
response, in light of the substantial perfor-
mance instruction, evidences an intent that 
Brown not recover anything under the con-
tract.4 Richards therefore claims the trial 
court impermissibly substituted its judg-
ment for that of the jury by allowing 
Brown to recover under the contract. See 
generally, First Security Bank of Utah v. 
Ezra C. Lundahl, Inc., 22 Utah 2d 433, 454 
P.2d 886, 889 (1969) (trial court may not 
make a "further finding" that contravenes 
jury's finding); Utah R.Civ.P. 49(a). Rich-
ards, however, misperceives the legal ef-
fect of the trial court's ruling. 
It is axiomatic that, in a jury trial, the 
jury determines the facts and the trial 
court determines the law. Richards erro-
neously claims that the trial court "sup-
planted" the jury's factual findings regard-
ing substantial performance with its own 
factual findings. In reality, the trial court 
simply applied the law to the jury's factual 
finding that Brown did not substantially 
perform his obligations under the contract. 
There is no factual finding by the jury that 
Brown could not recover anything under 
the contract. That is a question of law. 
The jury instruction and special interroga-
tory only explain that if Brown did not 
substantially perform his duties under the 
contract, he may not enforce the contract 
Purdue, 30 Utah 2d 389, 391-92, 518 P.2d 684, 
686 (1974) (Ellctt, J. dissenting) (quoting 17 
AmJur2d, Contracts § 365). See, e.g., Darrell J. 
Didencksen <Si Sons v. Magna Water and Sewer 
Improvement Dist., 613 P.2d 1116. 1119 (Utah 
1980); Wagstaff v. Remco, Inc., 540 P.2d 931, 
933 (Utah 1975). 
4. The following instruction, with our emphasis, 
was given to the jury regarding substantial per-
formance: 
In order for a party to recover on a con-
tract, said party must first establish by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence his own substan-
tial performance. A parly who seeks to take 
advantage of a right under the contract is 
charged with the burden of proving the facts 
against Richards. They do not indicate 
that, under all circumstances, Brown would 
be barred from recovering anything under 
the contract. 
Whether Brown could recover anything 
under the contract was Richards's decision. 
Richards could either: (1) rescind the con-
tract, in which case Brown would not recov-
er anything under the contract but would 
receive back that which he had conferred 
upon Richards, i.e., ownership of Interwest; 
or (2) elect to enforce the contract, in which 
case Richards would retain ownership of 
Interwest and Brown would be entitled to 
recover under the contract, after adjust-
ments for his lack of performance. Sidney 
Stevens Implement Co. v. Hintze, 92 Utah 
264, 67 P.2d 632, 638 (1937). Richards 
elected to enforce the contract. Richards's 
election allows Brown to recover under the 
contract, even though Brown himself could 
not have enforced the contract given the 
jury's factual finding. 
[8] In addition to his substantial perfor-
mance defense, Richards raised a fraud 
defense, under which he was likewise enti-
tled either to rescind the contract and ten-
der back ownership of Interwest or to re-
tain ownership and seek damages. Id.; see 
also Dugan, 615 P.2d at 1247; Perry v. 
Woodall, 20 Utah 2d 399, 401-02, 438 P.2d 
813, 815 (1968). In light of Richards's elec-
tion to retain ownership and enforce the 
contract, the jury was requested to find the 
difference between the actual value of In-
terwest, as received by Richards, and the 
value Interwest would have had if it had 
been as represented. This value differen-
necessary to show he has substantially per-
formed his side of the bargain. 
A party substantially performs his side of 
the contract where there has been no willful 
departure from the terms of the contract, and 
no omission in significant points, and the 
contract has been performed in its material 
and substantial particulars. // a party fails 
substantially to perform his duties under the 
contract, the law does not require the other 
party to perform or adhere to the contractual 
terms. Under those circumstances, the doc-
trine of substantial performance freleasesf the 
second party from his contractual obli-
gations and duties. 
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:
 tial is the "benefit of the bargain" rule that purchase price 
is followed in this jurisdiction. Lamb, 525 
' P.2d at 609; see also Dugan, 615 P.2d at 
1247; Dilworth v. Lauritzen, 18 Utah 2d 
386, 389, 424 P.2d 136, 137-38 (1967); Pace, 
2A1 P.2d at 277. The jury found the value 
differential to be $500,000. Richards 
claims that he is entitled to collect the 
$500,000 as a cash award and to retain 
ownership of Interwest without making 
any further payments therefor. 
[9] Brown correctly points out that if 
Richards is allowed to obtain full owner-
ship of Interwest for only the amount al-
ready paid and collect the difference be-
tween the value of Interwest as represent-
ed and as received, Richards would reap a 
windfall. He would collect a double recov-
ery, i.e., a $500,000 cash award and for-
giveness of his contractual obligation to 
Brown, worth approximately $700,000.5 
Such a double recovery would be contrary 
to the benefit of the bargain rule. The 
clear rationale of the rule is that because 
of the seller's fraud, the purchaser paid 
more for the asset than it was really worth. 
The purchaser therefore deserves to recoup 
the overpayment. Benefit of the bargain 
damages are, in effect, a refund to the 
purchaser of the overpayment in order to 
bring the effective purchase price in line 
with the actual value received. Both par-
ties thereby receive the full benefit of the 
bargain; the defrauded party only pays, 
and the culpable party only receives, the 
true value of the asset sold. 
[10,11] Where a contract is executory 
and the purchase price has yet to be paid in 
full, a cash award for the value differential 
and a forgiveness of any outstanding debt 
violates the goal of the benefit of the bar-
gain rule. Instead of receiving the true 
value of the asset sold, Brown would re-
ceive only the amount paid, which, in this 
case, appears to be less than the true value 
of Interwest as found by the jury. Brown 
would thereby not receive the benefit of 
the bargain. The fraud damages must 
therefore be offset against the contracted 
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F«.w r If Richards has not paid 
an amount sufficient to satisfy the adjust-
ed purchase price, he must satisfy the un-
paid portion in order to retain ownership of 
Interwest. Otherwise, he receives much 
more than his benefit of the bargain. 
Richards relies on Lamb v. Bangart, 525 
P.2d 602 (Utah 1974), in asserting that he is 
entitled to forgiveness of the debt and re-
covery of differential damages under the 
benefit of the bargain rule. Richards's re-
liance on Lamb is misplaced. In Lamb, the 
purchasers entered into a contract to pay 
$50,000 for one-half interest in a breeding 
bull. After paying a $20,000 deposit and 
entering into a contract to pay the remain-
ing $30,000 in one year, the purchasers 
discovered that the bull was injured and 
unable to produce. The bull's health was 
so feeble that the bull was shot shortly 
after the contract was signed. 
Richards relies upon the supreme court's 
statement that "[i]n the instant action, the 
balance of the unpaid purchase price was 
irrelevant in determining the measure of 
damages to which plaintiffs were entitled." 
In reality, the contract in Lamb provided 
that the additional outstanding $30,000 
payment would be excused if the bull died 
before the payment was due without pro-
ducing 1,500 ampules of semen. Id. at 608. 
The contractual debt was therefore ex-
cused under the express terms of the con-
tract, and not as a common law remedy as 
claimed by Richards. Therefore, the out-
standing balance was clearly not relevant 
in Lamb. 
As a general proposition, the existence of 
an outstanding balance is irrelevant to a 
determination of the difference between 
the true value of an asset and the value of 
the asset as misrepresented. The differ-
ence would be the same regardless of 
whether the purchaser has paid the pur-
chase price in full or in part. An outstand-
ing balance is only relevant to a determina-
tion of whether the seller must pay the 
purchaser, or the purchaser the seller, in 
5. Richards claims that there is no double recov-
ery because the $500,000 fraud award reflects 
consequential damages he incurred. Such a 
claim is unfounded in that the special interroga-
tory asked only for the value differential, not 
for consequential damages. 
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order to reach the benefit of the bargain 
being awarded. 
In the present case, Richards receives 
the benefit of his bargain by having his 
$500,000 award credited against the origi-
nal purchase price of $900,000. The pay-
ments already paid by Richards toward the 
purchase of Interwest must then be credit-
ed against an adjusted contract purchase 
price of $400,000. The trial court failed to 
follow this approach in its final judgment. 
Instead, it erroneously gave Brown an 
"award" on his claims that Richards 
breached the Interwest purchase agree-
ment, even though Richards proved that 
Brown had defrauded him. Brown clearly 
was not entitled to an award on his causes 
of action to enforce the agreement. The 
trial court should have addressed Brown's 
entitlement to the purchase price under its 
discussion of Richards's counterclaim for 
fraud as being a result of Richards's elec-
tion to enforce the contract. Accordingly, 
we vacate any award inconsistent with this 
approach. 
On remand, the trial court shall deter-
mine whether Brown must repay Richards, 
or Richards must pay Brown, using the 
adjusted purchase price of $400,000. If 
such recalculations show that Richards still 
owes Brown, Brown is entitled to recover 
such adjusted amounts under the contract.6 
This is the legal result of Richards's elec-
tion to affirm and enforce the contract 
rather than to rescind it. 
Prejudgment Interest 
[12 J The trial court awarded Richards 
prejudgment interest on his $500,000 fraud 
award. Brown asserts that this was error 
since fraud damages are not determinable 
with mathematical certainty, a precondition 
to awarding prejudgment interest. See 
generally Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins, 
Brown & Gunnell, Inc., 784 P.2d 475, 482 
(Utah App.1989). Without addressing the 
prejudgment interest debate directly, we 
reach the same net result as the trial court 
6. By recalculating Richards's payments against 
an initial principal amount of $400,000, rather 
than the contract principal amount of 5900.000, 
Richards will have effected a faster amortiza-
by a different analytical approach. See 
Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Associates,, 
752 P.2d 892, 894-95 (Utah 1988). 
The trial court awarded Brown his full 
contract purchase price of $900,000 plus 
interest at the rate of ten percent up until 
the time of trial. It then awarded Richards 
his fraud damages of $500,000 plus interest 
at the rate of ten percent up until the time 
of trial. In theory, the prejudgment inter-
est awarded Richards thereby cancels out 
the interest awarded Brown on the amount 
that Brown defrauded Richards, i.e., the 
$500,000. Under the trial court's analysis, 
Richards was required to pay Brown inter-
est on the amount Brown defrauded him. 
The award of prejudgment interest to Rich-
ards on the fraud damages was apparently 
an attempt to remedy this obvious injus-
tice. 
Richards was entitled to the $500,000 
fraud award at the time he was defrauded, 
i.e., the contract date. At that time, Brown 
had a voidable contract with a $900,000 
purchase price. According to the jury, 
however, the true value of Interwest was 
only $400,000. Brown therefore could not, 
as a matter of law, receive interest on the 
full $900,000 purchase price; he was only 
entitled to interest on the $400,000 adjusted 
purchase price. Cf. Vasels v. LoGuidice, 
740 P.2d 1375, 1378 (Utah App.1987) ("[pre-
judgment] interest accrued as damages 
arising out of a valid contract determined 
to have been breached by the other par-
ty."). 
By offsetting the original purchase price 
by the fraud damages at the time of con-
tracting, we reach the same result as 
awarded by the trial court Under this 
approach, we eliminate the perceived need 
for "prejudgment interest" on the fraud 
damages. 
BREACH OF WARRANTY 
[13] The jury found that Brown breach-
ed the warranties made in the Interwest 
purchase agreement and thereby caused 
tion. resulting in a different outstanding balance 




Richards $100,000 in damages. The trial 
court ruled, without explanation, that the 
breach of warranty damages were duplica-
tive of the fraud damages already found by 
the jury, and set the jury's verdict aside. 
Richards claims that there is a nonduplica-
tive basis for the breach of warranty award 
and the trial court erred by merely assum-
ing that the award was duplicative. 
One nonduplicative basis of damages 
pointed to by Richards is his claim for 
repairs to Interwest's fuel farm. Brown 
warranted that the assets of Interwest 
were in good and serviceable condition. In 
reality, Interwest's fuel farm was in seri-
ous disrepair and did not meet fire code 
standards. It cost Richards $176,000 to 
repair the fuel farm. The costs of repair 
were not included as damages under the 
fraud claim. They were only identified as 
a breach of warranty damage. The $176,-
000 claim for repairs provides sufficient 
grounds for the jury to make a nonduplica-
tive award for breach of warranty.7 
[14,15] A jury is allowed wide discre-
tion in awarding damages. Bennion v. 
LeGrand Johnson Constr. Co., 701 P.2d 
1078, 1083 (Utah 1985). Courts must defer 
to the jury's determination of damages un-
less (1) the jury disregarded competent evi-
dence, (2) the award is so excessive beyond 
rational justification as to indicate the ef-
fect of improper factors in the determina-
tion, and (3) the award was rendered under 
a misunderstanding. Id. at 1084. No such 
errors appear in this case to justify the 
trial court in striking the jury's award. 
The trial court's ruling amounted to noth-
ing more than mere speculation that the 
7. Arguably, Richards need not even prove that 
there was a nonduplicative basis for the jury's 
award because the proof required to prove 
fraud differs from that required to prove a 
breach of warranty. The jury may have simply 
found that Brown did not commit fraud in 
making some of the misrepresentations because 
he lacked fraudulent intent, but that he did have 
sufficient intent in making those representa-
tions to find a breach of warranty. 
8. The trial court gave the jury the following 
instruction: 
To prevail on a claim for breach of fiduciary 
duty, a party must prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence: 
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awards were duplicative. We therefore re-
verse the trial court's ruling and reinstate 
the jury's award of $100,000 to Richards 
for Brown's breach of warranty. 
FIDUCIARY DUTY 
[161 The trial court awarded Richards 
$300,000 in damages for Brown's breach of 
a fiduciary duty during the period when 
Brown and Richards were jointly operating 
Interwest. The breach arose from Brown's 
involvement in borrowing against a line of 
credit for operational costs when Richards 
and Brown had an agreement that the line 
of credit would only be used for purchasing 
airplanes for resale. Richards had signed 
as a personal guarantor on the line of 
credit. Brown claims that there was no 
evidence that he breached any fiduciary 
duty owed to Richards. 
The trial court instructed the jury that a 
breach of an understanding between joint 
venturers could constitute a breach of fidu-
ciary duty.8 Richards points to the evi-
dence of an agreement between Richards 
and Brown that the line of credit would 
only be used for aircraft acquisition. 
Brown claims there was no such agreement 
and presents his favorable evidence to that 
effect. The evidence was therefore in con-
flict. Given the deference we grant jury 
findings, we must conclude the jury consid-
ered the contradictory evidence and found 
that the parties in fact had such an under-
standing and that Brown breached it. 
Brown also claims that there was no 
evidence that Richards was damaged by 
the use of the line of credit for operational 
(1) That the parties were engaged in a joint 
venture; 
(2) That one party took actions which bene-
fitted himself at the expense of the joint ven-
ture and which were inconsistent with the 
understanding of the parties or otherwise act-
ed in a way inconsistent with the duties of 
loyalty, good faith, fairness and honesty owed 
by parties engaged in a joint venture to one 
another; and 
(3) That as a result, the other party suffered 
damages. 
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expenses. Brown's argument fails as a 
matter of law because Richards became 
legally obligated to satisfy a debt he did 
not wish to incur in the joint venture, i.e., 
debt for the operations of Interwest. Rich-
ards has therefore presented sufficient evi-
dence that he was damaged. 
Finally, Brown asserts that the award of 
$300,000 was not supported in the evidence. 
Richards asserts that the principal and in-
terest exceeds $300,000. Brown has not 
marshaled the evidence in favor of the 
award amount and has thereby failed to 
meet his burden of showing that no reason-
able person could find damages of $300,-
000. We therefore do not disturb the 
jury's finding. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
The trial court found that Richards was 
entitled to attorney fees as the prevailing 
party in the dispute concerning the Inter-
west purchase agreement. The trial court 
also found that Brown was entitled to at-
torney fees as the prevailing party in the 
dispute concerning the Interwest Building 
agreement. Without giving any calcula-
tions or explanations of the amounts, the 
trial court then awarded Richards $435,000 
for attorney fees pursuant to the Interwest 
purchase agreement, and Brown $250,000 
for attorney fees pursuant to the Interwest 
Building agreement. Brown claims that 
the trial court erred in its award of attor-
ney fees to Richards both as to entitlement 
and amount. 
Entitlement 
[17] Brown asserts that he alone is enti-
tled to attorney fees. He argues that the 
entire transaction should be combined as if 
there were but one attorney fee provision 
for the entire transaction. He would then 
be the prevailing party since he received a 
"net judgment" greater than that received 
by Richards. Such an argument is con-
9. Despite the trial court's mischaracterization of 
Brown's entitlement of payment under the con-
tract as an "award," Brown's receipt of the pur-
chase price could not properly be considered a 
judgment in Brown's favor when it was award-
ed pursuant to Richards's election to affirm the 
fraudulently induced contract. Brown there-
trary to the express terms of the Interwest 
purchase agreement which, with our em-
phasis, contains the following attorney fees 
provision: 
In the event suit is brought to enforce 
the provisions of this agreement, the 
prevailing party in such action shall be 
entitled to recover its reasonable attor-
ney's fees and costs incurred in connec-
tion therewith. 
As clearly stated, Brown agreed to com-
pensate Richards if Richards prevails in a 
suit brought to enforce the Interwest pur-
chase agreement. The agreement express-
ly refers to the prevailing party in suits 
relating to "this agreement," not the pre-
vailing party in suits relating to "this 
transaction." A review of the Interwest 
purchase agreement and the Interwest 
Building agreement shows that they are 
independent and may therefore be enforced 
separately. See Bess v. Jensen, 782 P.2d 
542, 544 (Utah App.1989) (significant factor 
in determining independence of contracts is 
whether they are supported by separate 
valid consideration). 
[18,19] Had Brown brought two sepa-
rate lawsuits, one on each agreement, Rich-
ards would clearly have received attorney 
fees in the case regarding the purchase of 
Interwest.9 The fact that a single lawsuit 
was brought to enforce both contracts does 
not eviscerate Richards's contractual right 
to attorney fees. The prevailing party on a 
given contract may recover fees without 
consideration of other claims in the same 
case arising from other contracts between 
the parties. See Elder v. Triax Co., 740 
P.2d 1320, 1323 (Utah 1987). To hold oth-
erwise would create a disincentive to com-
bine permissive counterclaims into one law-
suit. We therefore do not collapse the 
independent agreements involved in this 
multifaceted transaction and "net out" a 
single prevailing party.10 
fore did not receive any judgment to be "netted" 
against Richards's award of $500,000. 
10. Even if the contracts were merged into one, 
both parties are entitled to fees when both par-
tics arc successful in enforcing different provi-
sions of a contract against the other. Trayner v. 
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.<[20-22] Despite the fact that Richards 
was awarded damages on his fraud and 
breach of fiduciary duty claims, Brown ar-
gues that he actually prevailed because 
Richards did not obtain the full amount he 
was seeking. According to Brown, he "de-
feated" Richards on 90% of his fraud and 
breach of fiduciary duty claims because 
Richards only received 107© of his claimed 
damages. Such reasoning ignores the ines-
capable fact that while Richards may not 
have prevailed to the full extent he felt 
entitled, he nevertheless prevailed. It is 
the determination of culpability, not the 
amount of damages, that determines who is 
the prevailing party. See Highland 
Constr. Co. v. Stevenson, 636 P.2d 1034, 
1038 (Utah 1981) ("a party in whose favor 
an affirmative judgment is rendered, 
whether or not the judgment is for less 
than initially sought in the complaint, is the 
'prevailing party' "). While a reduction in 
the amount claimed by a plaintiff may 
seem a moral and financial victory for a 
defendant, it does not make the defendant 
the "prevailing party" in terms of attorney 
fees. Brown's claim he "prevailed" there-
fore fails. 
[23] Brown also claims that the trial 
court failed to award him some of his legal 
fees to which he was entitled. Brown suc-
cessfully defended against Richards's ef-
forts to rescind contracts unrelated to the 
sale of the Interwest assets. The trial 
court, however, dismissed these efforts be-
cause it perceived them to be only a minor 
portion of the overall lawsuit and did not 
award any attorney fees therefor. As is 
evident from our previous analysis, Brown 
was entitled to an award of attorney fees 
for successfully defending his contractual 
rights on contracts unrelated to the sale of 
the Interwest assets, even if such efforts 
were not a significant portion of the overall 
lawsuit. We therefore direct the trial 
court to address Brown's claim on remand. 
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Calculation 
Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984); see also 
Stacey Properties v. Wixen, 766 P.2d 1080, 1085 
(Utah App. 1988) (fees are appropriate for partial 
success); cf. Graco Fishing & Rental Tools, Inc. 
v. Ironwood Exploration, Inc., 766 P.2d 1074, 
1079-80 (Utah 1988) (suggesting need to "differ-
entiate between the time spent on the successful 
claim[s] and the time spent on unsuccessful 
[24,25] Brown asserts that the trial 
court erred in the amount of attorney fees 
awarded to Richards because it did not 
follow the guidelines set forth in Dixie 
State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 
1988). The supreme court recognized in 
Dixie State Bank that the calculation of 
attorney fees is in the sound discretion of 
the trial court and will not be overturned 
absent a showing of a clear abuse of discre-
tion. Id. at 988. It then set forth several 
factors that trial courts should consider in 
awarding attorney fees. In particular, it 
identified the following four questions that 
a trial court should answer before award-
ing attorney fees, 
1. What legal work was actually per-
formed? 
2. How much of the work performed 
was reasonably necessary to ade-
quately prosecute the matter? 
3. Is the attorney's billing rate consis-
tent with the rates customarily 
charged in the locality for similar 
services? 
4. Are there circumstances which re-
quire consideration of additional fac-
tors . . . ? 
Id. at 990 (footnotes omitted). See also 
Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 
266, 268 (Utah 1992) ("Except in the most 
simple cases, the evidence should include 
the hours spent on the case, the hourly rate 
or rates charged for those hours, and usual 
and customary rates for such work."). 
Trial courts should make findings on all 
of the factors they consider in awarding 
attorney fees. See, e.g., Cabrera v. Cott-
rell, 694 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1985). In the 
present case, the trial court acknowledged 
that it was "unable to arrive at allowable 
fees and costs with mathematical certain-
claims" and propriety of awarding fees only for 
the former). But see Mountain States Broad-
casting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551. 555-56 (Utah 
App.1989) (applying disfavored "net judgment" 
approach in holding only one prevailing party 
under circumstances of the case, even though 
both parties received monetary damages). 
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ty." " It proceeded to list a few factors 
that it considered, none of which answer 
the basic questions posed in Dixie State 
Bank. It then summarily awarded Rich-
ards $435,000. The findings do not indicate 
what work was actually performed in rela-
tion to the contractual claims upon which 
Richards prevailed and that it was neces-
sary, nor do they indicate the billing rate of 
Richards's counsel and the customary rate 
in this market. 
In this case, the award of attorney fees 
is a complex matter due to the adjudication 
of multiple claims arising under several 
contracts with each party winning some 
and losing some. Given the complexities, 
the trial court's summary findings are sim-
ply too sparse for us to determine whether 
the trial court made a permissible award. 
"Unless the record clearly and uncontro-
vertedly support's the trial court's decision, 
the absence of adequate findings of fact 
precludes appellate review of the evidentia-
ry basis underlying the trial court's deci-
sion and requires remand for more detailed 
findings by the trial court." Quinn v. 
Quinn, 830 P.2d 282, 286 (Utah App.1992) 
(failure to make adequate findings regard-
ing attorney fees was an abuse of discre-
tion). See also Martindale v. Adams, 111 
P.2d 514, 518 (Utah App.1989) (trial court 
must identify the factors upon which it 
relies in awarding attorney fees in order 
"to permit meaningful review"). 
[26] When a party is contractually enti-
tled to attorney fees, the trial court's find-
ings regarding those fees should be just as 
complete as its findings regarding other 
types of contractual damages. See Cotton-
wood Mall, 830 P.2d at 268. "These find-
ings must be sufficiently detailed, and in-
clude enough subsidiary facts, to disclose 
the steps by which the trial court's decision 
was reached." Quinn, 830 P.2d at 286. 
11. Wc note that had the trial court followed the 
approach outlined in Dixie State Dank, it might 
not have reached mathematical certainty, but it 
would have achieved a reasonable basis for its 
award. This is our objective in requiring trial 
courts to follow a more disciplined approach in 
awarding attorney fees. 
12. On remand, Richards 
must set out the time and fees expended for 
(1) successful claims lor which there may be 
We conclude in this case that the trial court 
abused its discretion by not adequately set-
ting forth its analysis in a manner permit-
ting appellate review. We therefore vacate 
the award of attorney fees to Richards and 
remand for a recalculation in accordance 
with this opinion.12 
On Appeal 
[27] Both parties seek attorney fees on 
appeal. The general rule is that when a 
party who received attorney fees below 
prevails on appeal, the party is also entitled 
to fees reasonably incurred on appeal. 
Management Servs. v. Development As-
socs., 617 P.2d 406, 408-09 (Utah 1980). A 
review of the issues on appeal reveals that 
they relate to the Interwest purchase 
agreement and that Richards was success-
ful on each major issue discussed with the 
exception of his argument that he was enti-
tled both to the $500,000 fraud award and 
to forgiveness of his contractual debt. 
While Brown was successful in limiting the 
amount claimed by Richards on the fraud 
claim, Richards nevertheless prevailed on 
the issue of culpability and is therefore the 
prevailing party on appeal. 
The one issue that Brown has prevailed 
upon on appeal was the question of wheth-
er the trial court erred in not awarding him 
attorney fees for his successes in defend-
ing against Richards's efforts to rescind 
other contracts. Inasmuch as Brown suc-
cessfully defended a contractual right de-
nied by the trial court, he is entitled to his 
reasonable attorney fees which he can 
show were incurred on that issue on ap-
peal. Naturally, Richards is not entitled to 
any fees he incurred in unsuccessfully de-
fending against this claimed error. 
Attorney fees and costs arising from this 
appeal are therefore awarded in general to 
an entitlement to attorney fees, (2) unsuccess-
ful claims for which there would have been 
an entitlement to attorney fees had the claims 
been successful, and (3) claims for which 
there is no entitlement to attorney fees. 
Cottonwood Mail, 830 P.2d at 269-70. The trial 
court's findings should then mirror the forego-
ing categories so that they may be reviewable. 
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Richards and in limited part to Brown. On 
remand, the parties are to make their re- Margaret HOLM, Plaintiff 
spective evidentiary showings of reason- and Appellant, 
able fees as outlined in this opinion. 
v. 
CONCLUSION 
We reverse the trial court's refusal to 
grant Richards a directed verdict on 
Brown's claim that there was an unwritten 
agreement to increase the purchase price 
of Interwest. The parties' benefit of the 
bargain is to be calculated by the trial 
court at the time of contracting by deduct-
ing the jury's award of $500,000 from the 
initial contract price of $900,000 for an 
adjusted purchase price of $400,000. Rich-
ards's election to retain ownership of Inter-
west requires him to satisfy any outstand-
ing obligation to Brown under the terms of 
the Interwest purchase agreement based 
upon the adjusted purchase price of $400,-
000. The trial court is directed on remand 
to recalculate Richards's outstanding bal-
ance and interest owing at the time of trial. 
We reinstate the jury's verdict that Rich-
ards was entitled to $100,000 on his breach 
of warranty claim. We affirm the award 
of $300,000 on Richards's breach of fiducia-
ry duty claim. We also affirm the trial 
court's determination that Richards was en-
titled to attorney fees, but vacate the 
award and remand for a redetermination of 
the amount of fees. We also reverse the 
trial court's failure to award Brown attor-
ney fees for his successful efforts in en-
forcing his contractual rights unrelated to 
the sale of the Interwest assets. 
We remand for further proceedings con-
sistent with this opinion. Costs and attor-
ney fees on appeal are awarded as de-
scribed herein. 
BILLINGS and GARFF, JJ., concur. 
Michael SMILOWITZ, Defendant 
and Appellee. 
No. 910594-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Sept. 25, 1992. 
Mother appealed from an order of the 
District Court, Iron County, J. Philip Eves, 
J., which denied her motion for relief from 
a Utah order enforcing an undomesticated 
Ohio child custody order. The Court of 
Appeals, Russon, J., held that: (1) district 
court not only erred in determining that it 
had no jurisdiction, but also erred in refus-
ing to hold a hearing to examine whether 
jurisdiction should be exercised; (2) Utah 
district court erred in enforcing undomesti-
cated Ohio custody modification order 
when it, in fact, was obligated to enforce 
the only document legally before it, the 
original Ohio divorce decree, which granted 
custody of the parties' child to mother; (3) 
commissioner and district court violated 
mother's due process rights by refusing 
her attorney's request for a hearing on the 
undomesticated Ohio order; and (4) district 
court erred in permitting commissioner to 
exceed her authority. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Orme, J., filed a specially concurring 
opinion in which Billings, J., joined. 
1. Appeal and Error <S=>842(1), 982(2) 
Generally, Court of Appeals will only 
reverse a denial of a motion to vacate an 
order or judgment upon a showing of 
abuse of discretion by trial court, however, 
when denial of such a motion rests on an 
underlying jurisdictional determination, it 
becomes a question of law upon which 
court does not have to defer to the district 
court. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 60(b). 
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The Court announced its oral decision in the attorney's 
fees/cost issues on April 1, 1996. Thereafter, defendants filed a 
Motion for Further Reconsideration of the Court's April 1, 1996 
Ruling Regarding Attorney's Fees. Also, defendants filed Richards' 
Objection and to Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Judgment and Memorandum in Support of Richards' Motion 
for Reconsideration. Following replies thereto, the Court heard 
oral arguments thereon on June 17, 1996. Because some of the 
materials and case law was submitted too late for the Court's 
consideration and the Court wanted to further consider its rulings 
on the post-appeal fees and costs, the matter was taken under 
advisement. 
BROWN V. RICHARDS PAGE TWO MINUTE ENTRY 
The Court has now had an opportunity to review and consider 
the authorities submitted and has recanvassed considerable 
materials. 
Any attack on fees found by this Court to be reasonable for 
Richards is unwarranted by a comparison with fees awarded earlier 
by this Court to Brown. The Brown fees were not appealed, while 
the Richards' fees were, thus subjecting the Richards' fees to a 
review consistent with the remand instructions of the Utah Court of 
Appeals. Although counsel may criticize the methodology directed 
to be utilized by this Court in arriving at reasonable fees, this 
Court has no similar freedom. Even though the proofs presented at 
remand hearing were admittedly not in conformity with the Court of 
Appeals' remand instructions, the Court nonetheless made a 
significant effort to consider the factors outlined by the Utah 
Court of Appeals in arriving at reasonable fees to be awarded 
Richards. 
The fees of $218,986.42 found to be reasonable by the Court 
for services rendered by counsel for Richards through trial shall 
remain the same as previously announced by the Court in its April 
1, 1996 oral decision. Also, the $80,987.28 found to be reasonable 
by the Court for services rendered by counsel for Richards on the 
appeal shall remain the same. In addition, the Court's rulings on 
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costs were based on the usual and ordinary interpretation of the 
word "costs" used in the contract; and the rulings on costs shall 
remain as previously made. The broader term "expenses" was not 
used in the contract. 
The Court has reconsidered its rulings on post-appeal fees and 
costs in light of the majority opinion of the Utah Supreme Court in 
the case of David L. Salmon v. Davis County, et al., 916 P. 2d 890 
(Utah 1996) . In view of the majorities' allowance of fees incurred 
in seeking fees, the Court revisits the post-appeal fee and cost 
issue. 
As in all other fee claims, Richards' attorneys adduced 
evidence on the number of hours spent, their hourly rates, 
previously found by the Court to be consistent with those rates 
customarily charged in the community, and they generally described 
the tasks performed, or services rendered. The billings to the 
clients were submitted in support of the time and services 
involved. The overall time expended by counsel post-appeal has 
been questioned by plaintiffs' counsel. 
In the announced decision of April 1, 1996, the claim for 
$78,169.32 was disallowed by the Court for failure to allocate time 
and services. On reflection, the Court concludes it was wrong. 
Except for time expended on post-judgment lien and security 
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problems and the form and content of supplemental Findings, 
Conclusions and post-appeal Judgments, which include some other 
issues involving accounting, interest computation and possibly 
others, the substantial time and efforts of Richards' attorneys has 
been directed to the attorney's fee, costs and relevant interest 
issues. 
The Court finds that counsel for Richards used "block billing11 
in this case. The testimony of George T. Naegle and David B. 
Thompson on time recording and billing practices, i.e., recording 
time and billing therefore for specific tasks was very credible. 
As Mr. Naegle testified, the insurance industry has required 
particualrized billings since the late 1980's. Moreover, their 
testimony is consistent with the remand instructions of the Utah 
Court of Appeals in this case and in the earlier pronouncements of 
both the Utah Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. 
Because time was not entered and accounted for by specific 
tasks, the internal accounting system could not mechanically 
allocate time. As a result, many needless hours were expended 
manually allocating time, which could have been much more 
efficiently handled as an accounting function. Moreover, many 
hours and much expense has been incurred in the fee debate. 
BROWN V. RICHARDS PAGE FIVE MINUTE ENTRY 
The combined fee-cost request of $78,169.32 for post-appeal 
time and expense is found by the Court to be excessive and 
unreasonable. Allowing 60% thereof is found by the Court to 
achieve a more reasonable allowance. Accordingly, in addition to 
the amounts awarded in the April 1, 1996 decision, the Court finds 
it reasonable to award defendants' counsel an additional $46,901.59 
in fees for post-appeal time and expenses, with interest thereon at 
the rate of 10% per annum from and after July 1, 1995 to date of 
post-appeal judgment. 
With respect to the post-judgment interest issue, the Court 
has again reviewed the James Constructors, Inc. case, Mason v. 
Western Mortgage Loan Corporation, 754 P.2d 984 (Utah App. 1988), 
and the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals in this case. This 
Court found what it had determined to be reasonable fees through 
trial for both Brown and Richards and entered Judgment thereon on 
October 18, 1990. Although Presiding Judge Bench at page 157 of 
the decision reported in 840 P. 2d 143 indicated the award was 
"vacated", it is clear that the case was remanded "for a 
redetermination of the amount of fees." Based thereon, the 
rationale of the Mason case is applicable. Accordingly, defendants 
Richards are awarded post-judgment interest at the rate of 12% per 
annum on the $218,986.42 from and after October 18, 1990 until paid 
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or satisfied. The Court concludes that all Judgment rates of 
interest are the applicable statutory interest rate at the date of 
entry of the Judgment, and said Judgment rate shall remain 
throughout the life of the Judgment. All other amounts awarded in 
the bench decision of April 1, 1996 and the $46,901.59 awarded 
herein shall bear interest at the rate of 10% per annum from and 
after February 3, 1995 to date of Judgment, with the applicable 
Judgment rate thereon applying as of the date of the entry of the 
post-appeal Judgment and to continue in force and effect until paid 
or fully satisfied. 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Supplemental Attorney's Fees and 
Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Supplemental Attorney's Fees have been reviewed in light of 
defendants' Objections. The post-appeal Findings and Conclusions 
need to be supplemented. The Court has reviewed plaintiffs' claim 
for supplemental fees in the amount of $7,879.50. The Court finds 
that the time expended by Brown's attorneys in successfully 
defending against Richards' efforts to rescind contracts unrelated 
to the sale of Interwest assets and in successful efforts in 
enforcing contractual rights unrelated to the sale of Interwest 
assets was reasonable, that their hourly rates were appropriate and 
well within the rates customarily charged in the community for such 
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charges. The Court finds the amount of $7,879.50 to be a 
reasonable charge for the services rendered, and concludes that 
Brown should be awarded Judgment therefore, together with 10% per 
annum interest from and after February 3, 1995 to date of Judgment, 
with the applicable Judgment rate thereon applying as of the date 
of the entry of the post-appeal Judgment and to continue in force 
and effect until paid or fully satisfied. 
Attorneys for plaintiffs shall prepare new Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law on Post-Appeal Matters and a new Post-Appeal 
Judgment in conformance with the April 1, 1996 bench decision, as 
modified hereby. The post-appeal Findings, Conclusions and 
Judgment shall then be submitted to counsel for defendants to sign 
"approved as to form." Thereafter, they shall be submitted to 
Judge Henriod for signature and entry. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this / H day of 
January, 199 6: 
Bruce E. Coke 
John W. Call 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
33 3 North 3 00 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Robert S. Campbell, Jr., Esq. 
201 S. Main, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Elizabeth T. Dunning 
Attorney for Defendants 
111 E. Broadway, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
BOYD J. BROWN, an individual, ; 
and INTERWEST AVIATION ; 
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation ] 
Plaintiffs and ] 
Counter Defendants, ] 
vs. ] 
DAVID K. RICHARDS & ] 
COMPANY and DAVID K. ; 
RICHARDS, an individual, ; 
Defendants and ] 
Counter Plaintiffs. ] 
> FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) ON POST APPEAL MATTERS 
> (POST RECONSIDERATION) 
) Civil No. C87-01411 
i Judge: Stephen L. Henroid 
Subsequent to the appeal in this case, the court has heard evidence and argument 
regarding a number of issues, including defendants' ("Richards") trial, appeal and post-appeal 
attorney fees, a limited portion of plaintiffs' ("Brown") attorneys fees, pre-judgment and post-
judgment interest and recoverable costs. 
Pursuant to motion, the court on August 29, 1994 heard argument on Brown's motion 
for partial summary judgment issues of interest and post-appeal fees. The court ruled that 
compound interest was improper; that Richards was entitled to pre-judgment interest on the 
breach of warranty damages from April 24, 1984, at the contract rate of 10%; and that Richards 
was entitled to pre-judgment interest on the yet-to-be-determined attorneys fees. The court 
reserved a decision on the issue of Richards' post-appeal fees. 
The court permitted the plaintiff to elicit testimony from defendants' attorneys via sworn 
courtroom testimony of Elizabeth T. Dunning on April 12, 1994, which testimony continued via 
deposition on April 20, 1994. The court also granted Brown's motion to hold a full evidentiary 
hearing on attorney fees, which hearing was from January 31, 1995 through February 3, 1995. 
During that hearing Brown and Richards both called witnesses in support of their respective 
positions on attorneys fees. The transcripts of Ms. Dunning's testimony were also submitted. 
The Court announced its decision on April 1, 1996. 
On June 17, 1996 the Court heard argument on Richard's motion to reconsider and took 
the matter under advisement. The court has also heard argument of the issue of interest-and has 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on the attorneys fees and interest issues. 
After considering the evidence and arguments of counsel, the court now makes and enters its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The total time expended by the attorneys for both parties was reasonably close and 
to some extent validates the overall reasonableness of time and services rendered by the 
attorneys in pursuing the case to conclusion. However, the Brown fees were not appealed, while 
the Richards' fees were, thus subjecting the Richards' fees to review consistent with the remand 
instructions of the Utah Court of Appeals. Even though the proofs presented at the remand 
2 
hearing were admittedly not in conformity with the remand instructions, the Court nonetheless 
made a significant effort to consider the factors outlined by the court of appeals in arriving at 
reasonable fees to be awarded to Richards. 
2. The hourly billing rates charged by counsel for defendants, while somewhat higher 
than those billed by plaintiffs' attorneys, were nonetheless generally consistent with rates 
customarily charged in the community for similar services considering the complexities of the 
litigation involved and the experience and skills of defendants' counsel. 
3. Defendants' counsel did not allocate time based on individual claims because of 
the impracticality of doing so. It would be difficult if not impossible in many instances to know 
how efforts made might relate to one claim or another. There was an overlapping of the 
warranty evidence and fraud evidence such that one could not allocate the time expended to one 
claim or the other with any degree of precision. The entries in the billing of defendants' counsel 
are like those of counsel for plaintiffs, quite general and vague. 
4. Over 200 hours were expended by counsel for defendants following the appeal in 
attempting to allocate time expended in this case. 
5. Of the $1,450,000.00 found by the jury in favor of Richards, $100,000 was found 
by the jury as damages resulting to breach of warranties. In achieving that result, counsel for 
defendants, in pursuing the claims of the counterclaim, dealt with the issues of fraud, negligent 
misrepresentation, breach of warranty, breach of fiduciary duty, punitive damages and damages. 
In addition, defendants pursued a claim for rescission which ultimately was dropped prior to 
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trial. Also, a part performance claim was asserted by them when the case was submitted to the 
jury. 
6. In defending plaintiffs' complaint, defendants' counsel dealt with issues relating 
to the sale of assets as well as issues relating to the sale of the building which were generally 
less difficult and more straight forward. Defendants' counsel dealt with tax issues, rent issues, 
continuance problems and the extended problems relating to defendants' damage claims, efforts 
in seeking mandamus, problems relating to the undertaking of security and other miscellaneous 
problems along the way. 
7. The theme of Richards' case was fraud. Defendants' counsel carried that claim 
to the jury by clear and convincing evidence by far the greater quantity of evidence and the 
greater number of witnesses supported negligent misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty. 
The result of expenditure of time, efforts and expenses are clearly mirrored in the jury's verdict. 
8. On appeal the defendants successfully defeated plaintiffs' claims to an increased 
purchase price of $500,000 for the Interwest assets when Richards did not exercise the option 
to purchase the executive air terminal building, which was a significant appeal issue. In 
addition, defendants successfully reinstated the $100,000 breach of warranty verdict on appeal. 
9. Brown and Interwest on the other hand successfully defended Richards' claim for 
rescission for which Brown was entitled to an award of fees. 
10. Brown and Interwest prevailed in gaining a remand on the issue of the fees 
awarded by the trial court to Richards through trial. 
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11. There were a number of other issues raised on appeal which were considered but 
were not treated by the court of appeals in its decision. 
12. The Court has reconsidered Richards' claim for post-appeal fees in light of the 
Utah Supreme Court's opinion allowing fees incurred in seeking fees in Salmon v. Davis Co., 
916 P.2d 890 (Utah 1996). 
13. The substantial time and efforts of Richards' attorneys post-appeal, except for time 
expended on post-judgment lien and security issues, on the form and content of supplemental 
Findings, Conclusions and Post-Appeal Judgments (which include other issues involving 
accounting, interest computations, etc.), have been directed to attorney fees, costs and relevant 
interest issues. 
14. Counsel for Richards' comst 1 used "block-billing" in this case. The testimony 
of George T. Naegle and David B. Thompson on time recording and billing practices, i.e. 
recording time and billing therefore for the specific tasks was very credible. As Mr. Naegle 
testified, the insurance industry has required particularized billings since the late 1980's. 
Moreover, their testimony is consistent with the remand instructions of the Utah Court of 
Appeals in this case and the earlier pronouncements of the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah 
Court of Appeals. 
15. Because time was not entered and accounted for by specific tasks, the internal 
accounting system could not mechanically allocate time. As a result, many needless post-appeal 
hours were spent allocating time, which could have been much more efficiently handled as an 
accounting function. 
5 
16. Moreover, many hours and expense have been incurred in the fee debate. 
Having made and entered the foregoing Findings of Fact and having considered its 
previous rulings, the Court now makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The court concludes that the allocation of fees by defendants' counsel allocates 
more time to defendants' claims of breach of warranty than is reasonable and fair. The court 
concludes that a more reasonable allocation of time expended in successfully pursuing that claim 
would be generally 35% of the total time expended through trial. Based upon the total fees 
generated through trial, this results in a presently allowable fee to Richards of $218,986.42. 
2. The court concludes that the allocation of fees by defendants' counsel allocates 
more time to defendants' successful claims on appeal and makes no allowance for the fact that 
plaintiffs prevailed on many issues. The defendants' request of $134,751.00 for fees incurred 
on appeal and for aejt unsuccessful petition for certiorari to the Utah Supreme Court does not 
allocate those fees to any particular claims. The court finds that a more reasonable allocation 
of time in successfully pursuing the appeal would be 60% of the total fees expended by 
defendants' counsel, or $80,987.28 awarded to Richards for appeals fees. 
3. Defendants seek attorneys fees and costs incurred on post-appeal matters from 
November 1, 1993 through February 1, 1995 in the amount of $78,169.32. This amount is 
excessive and unreasonable. The Court finds that 60% of that amount, or $46,901.59, is 
reasonable, with interest of 10% per annum from and after July 1, 1995 to the date of the post-
appeal Judgment. 
6 
4. As found by the court of appeals, plaintiffs' counsel is entitled to fees incurred 
in successfully resisting defendants' rescission claim. The Court finds the hourly rates charged 
by Brown's counsel were appropriate and well within the rates customarily charged in the 
community for such services, and therefore plaintiffs are entitled to fees against defendants in 
the principal amount of $7,879.50, with 10% interest per annum thereon from February 3, 1995 
until the date of the post-appeal judgment. Thereafter judgment interest shall accrue at the rate 
of 7.45% per annum on the principal amount. 
5. The language of the contract in question provides for recovery to the prevailing 
party of its reasonable attorneys fees and costs. The broader term "expenses" was not used in 
the contract. The court construes costs in its usual and ordinary meaning. 
6. There appears to be no dispute in defendants' appellate costs and defendants are 
therefore entitled to recover appeal costs of $1,835.09. 
7. Defendants are entitled to recoverable trial costs of $235.00 for filing fees and 
$955.00 for witness fees, for a total of $1,190.00. 
8. The court concludes that other identifiable expenses incurred by defendants are 
not properly recoverable as costs. 
9. The Court, under James Constructors, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 888 
P.2d 665 (Utah App. 1994) (decided after this court's August 29, 1994 ruling), concludes that 
pre-judgment interest on attorney fees is appropriate. Although the Utah Court of Appeals' 
opinion in this case indicated Richards' fee award was "vacated," it is clear that the case was 
remanded "for a redetermination of the amount of fees." 840 P.2d at 157. Accordingly, the 
7 
rationale of Mason v. Western Mortgage, ISA P.2d 984 (Utah App. 1988) is applicable. 
Therefore, the court concludes that it would be fair and reasonable to award pre-judgment 
interest on the attorney fees awarded by this court at the rate of 12% per annum on the trial fees 
of $218,986.42 from and after October 18, 1990. 
10. The Court concludes that all judgment rates of interest for new amounts awarded 
in the post-appeal judgement are fees and costs awarded pursuant to the contracts between the 
parties. These awards must therefore bear interest at the contract rate of 10% per annum. 
DATED this Qr{ day of //UcU^A^ , 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
STEPHEN L/HENROID, DISTRICT JUDGE 
V 
Approved As To Form: 
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DAVID K. RICHARDS & 
COMPANY and DAVID K. 
RICHARDS, an individual, 
Defendants and 
Counter Plaintiffs. 
The trial by jury in the above cause began February 28, 1989 and concluded with the 
jury's verdict on April 22, 1989. The jury returned a special verdict which was incorporated 
in the Final Judgment entered by the court on October 18, 1990. Thereafter the parties appealed 
and an opinion was rendered in Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143 (Utah App. 1992) by the Utah 
Court of Appeals. 
Pursuant to the direction of the Utah Court of Appeals, the October 18, 1990 judgment 
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defendants ("Richards") for fraud, to $400,000.00 and to vacate the judgment in favor of 
plaintiffs ("Brown") for a $500,000.00 increase in purchase price. The jury's verdict awarding 
$100,000.00 to Richards on his breach of warranty counterclaim is to be reinstated. The other 
awards on Brown's claims and Richards' claims were affirmed, except the attorney fee award 
to Richards was vacated by the court of appeals and the matter remanded for a redetermination 
of the amount of fees due Brown. 
This Court was directed to determine the amount of fees Brown was entitled to in 
enforcing his contractual rights unrelated to the asset sale. Accordingly, this Court took 
evidence from the parties and their attorneys, culminating in an evidentiary hearing held from 
January 30, 1995 through February 3, 1995. The Court announced its decision on April 1, 
1996. On June 17, 1996 the Court heard argument on Richards' motion to reconsider and took 
the matter under advisement. The court has also heard argument of the issue of interest and has 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on the attorneys fees and interest issues. 
Now, therefore, being duly advised in the premises, it is therefore: 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
I. 
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ON AMENDED COMPLAINT. 
1. On plaintiffs' first cause of action, judgment is hereby entered in favor of Boyd 
J. Brown and against David K. Richards individually, and David K. Richards & Company in 
the amount of $200,000.00 ($450,000.00 contract price, less $250,000.00, one-half of the 
$500,000.00 reduction ordered by the Utah Court of Appeals), subject to the following interest, 
credits and adjustments: 
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Accrued Contract Interest: $ 23,506.20 
Less Total Payments: $ 164.925.00 
Principal Balance due on 4-1-86: $ 58,581.20 
Interest has accrued from April 1, 1986 on the unpaid balance at the rate of 10% per annum, 
pursuant to the contract. Through February 1, 1997 the accrued interest is $63,461.01. Brown 
is therefore awarded judgment in the amount of $122,042.21, principal and interest through 
February 1, 1997. Interest shall continue to accrue from that date at the contract interest rate 
of 10% per annum on the $58,581.20 principal balance. 
2. On the plaintiffs' second cause of action, judgment is entered in favor of Boyd 
J. Brown and against David K. Richards individually and David K. Richards & Company in the 
amount of $200,000.00 ($450,000.00 contract price, less $250,000.00, one-half of the 
$500,000.00 reduction ordered by the Utah Court of Appeals), subject to the following interest, 
credits and adjustments: 
Accrued Contract Interest: $ 22,542.00 
Less Total Payments: $ 53.693.90 
Balance due on 4-1-86 $168,848.10 
Interest on unpaid balance on 12/89 $ 11,301.64 
Principal Judgment as of 12/20/89 $181,149.74 
The principal balance due has accrued interest at the contract rate of 10% per annum -in the 
amount of $182,913.19, as of February 1, 1997, together with additional interest on the interest 
portion of the judgment balance from December 20, 1989 to February 1, 1997 of $8,046.76. 
Brown is therefore awarded judgment in the amount of $372,109.69 as of February 1, 1997. 
Interest shall continue to accrue at the contract interest rate of 10% per annum on the balance. 
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3. On plaintiffs' sixth cause of action regarding the increased purchase price, 
pursuant to the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals the judgment previously awarded Brown 
is hereby vacated. 
4. On plaintiffs' third cause of action, the jury found that David K. Richards 
individually and David K. Richards & Company owed, at the time of trial, the amount of 
$407,259.00 on the agreement to purchase the Interwest building. There remained at that time 
$490,000.00 in principal which was not yet due, but which has now become due. The court 
awarded Brown judgment for $529,996.10, which included $248,371.00 principal payments then 
due. The last payment made by Richards, as indicated in exhibit D-269, included a $31,629.00 
payment principal, leaving the principal due and owing, as of April 2, 1986, of $668,371.00. 
All payments of principal and interest thereon have now become due and plaintiff Boyd J. Brown 
is therefore awarded judgment in that amount against David K. Richards individually and David 
K. Richards & Company. Pursuant to the contract, interest accrues at the rate of 10% per 
annum. Interest due thereon as of February 1, 1997 is $724,046.30, for a total judgment of 
$1,392,417.30 as of February 1, 1997. Interest shall continue to accrue at the contract interest 
rate of 10% per annum on the $668,371.00 principal balance. 
5. On plaintiffs' fourth cause of action, the court previously granted a motion for 
directed verdict and this cause of action was dismissed with prejudice in the October 18, 1990 
judgment. 
6. On plaintiffs' fifth cause of action, for rent on the Executive Building, the court 
granted judgment in favor of Boyd J. Brown and against David K. Richards individually and 
David K. Richards & Company in the principal amount of $230,141.00 together with interest 
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then owing of $16,645.81. Since that time additional contract interest has accrued on the 
principal through February 1, 1997 in the amount of $144,643.62, for a total judgment of 
$391,430.43 as of February 1, 1997. Interest shall continue to accrue on the principal balance 
of $230,141.00 at the contract rate. 
7. In addition to rent on the Executive Building, judgment was entered in the October 
18, 1990 judgment in favor of Boyd J. Brown and against David K. Richards individually and 
David K. Richards & Company for the rent on the Interwest Building in the principal amount 
of $6,250.00, plus interest accruing through December 20, 1989 in the amount of $3,006.85. 
Since December 20, 1989 the accrued interest at the contract rate is $4,445.01, for a total 
judgment of $13,701.86 as of February 1, 1997. Interest shall continue to accrue on the 
principal amount from that date at the contract rate. 
8. The October 18, 1990 judgment was entered in favor of Boyd J. Brown and 
against David K. Richards individually and David K. Richards & Company in the principal 
amount of $250,000.00 for Brown's attorney fees. Since that time interest has accrued at the 
contract rate of 10% per annum in the amount of $157,125.00, for a total judgment of 
$407,125.00 as of February 1, 1997. Judgment interest shall continue to accrue at the contract 
rate of 10% per annum on the principal amount. 
9. In addition to the trial fees awarded to Brown, judgment is hereby entered in favor 
of Boyd J. Brown and against David K. Richards individually and David K. Richards & 
Company for additional attorney fees, as directed by the Utah Court of Appeals, in the principal 
amount of $7,879.50, together with 10% pre-judgment interest from February 5, 1995 to the 
date of entry herein ($1,569.52 as of February 1, 1997), for a total judgment of $9,449.02 as 
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of February 1, 1997. Judgment interest at the contract rate of 10% per annum shall accrue on 
the principal balance from the date of entry herein. 
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ON THE COUNTERCLAIMS OF DAVID K. RICHARDS & 
COMPANY AND DAVID K. RICHARDS INDIVIDUALLY. 
1. As to the First Claim for Relief for fraudulent misrepresentation, this Court 
entered judgment against Boyd J. Brown and Interwest Aviation Corporation in the amount of 
$500,000.00 together with interest from April 22, 1984 in its October 18, 1990 judgment. 
Pursuant to the direction of the Utah Court of Appeals this award of $500,000.00 was applied 
as a reduction of the amounts owed on the first and second half of the Asset Sale Agreement. 
Accordingly, the judgment of this Court for $500,000.00 on the first Claim for Relief is hereby 
satisfied. 
2. With regard to the remaining part of defendants' First Claim for Relief as to 
punitive damages, the court entered judgment on October 18, 1990 in favor of David K. 
Richards & Company and David K. Richards individually against Boyd J. Brown in the principal 
amount of $550,000.00, together with interest through December 20, 1989, in the amount of 
$36,465.75. Since December 20, 1989 additional statutory judgment interest at the rate of 12% 
has accrued in the amount of $470,250.00, for a total judgment of $1,056,715.75 as of February 
1, 1997. Judgment interest shall continue to accrue on the principal amount at the rate of 12% 
per annum. 
3. As to the defendants' Second Claim for Relief for negligent misrepresentation, 
although the jury determined that negligent misrepresentations were made, this Court determined 
that the measure of compensatory damages was identical to the damages awarded defendants 
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under the First Claim for Relief and subsumed thereby. Therefore, judgment is entered in favor 
of David K. Richards & Company and David K. Richards individually against Boyd J. Brown 
and Interwest Aviation in the amount of $0.00. 
4. As to defendants' Third Claim for Relief of breach of warranty, the jury 
determined that Boyd J. Brown and Interwest Aviation Corp. breached warranties to David K. 
Richards & Company and David K. Richards individually in the sale of the Interwest business 
assets and found as damages thereof the amount of $100,000.00 pursuant to the directive of the 
Utah Court of Appeals, judgment is entered in favor of David K. Richards & Company and 
David K. Richards individually and against Boyd J. Brown and Interwest Aviation Corp. in the 
amount of $100,000.00, together with contract interest at 10% from April 24, 1984 through 
February 1, 1997, in the present amount of $127,672.40 for a total judgment of $227,672.40 
as of February 1, 1997. Interest shall continue to accrue at the contract interest rate of 10% per 
annum on the $100,000.00 principal balance. 
5. As to defendants' Fourth Claim for Relief for breach of fiduciary duty, judgment 
was entered on the jury verdict in the principal amount of $300,000.00 in favor of David K. 
Richards & Company and David K. Richards individually against Boyd J. Brown in the final 
judgment of October 18, 1990, together with interest through December 20, 1989 in the amount 
of $19,890.41. Additional statutory judgment interest at 12% per annum has accrued from that 
day through February 1, 1997 in the amount of $255,360.00. Total judgment therefore is 
$575,250.41 as of February 1, 1997. Judgment interest shall continue to accrue on the principal 
amount at the rate of 12% per annum. 
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6. Pursuant to the Utah Court of Appeals' opinion, the prior judgment for fees 
awarded to Richards is vacated. Therefore, pursuant to this court's post-appeal findings of fact 
and conclusions of law, judgment is entered in favor of David K. Richards, individually, and 
David K. Richards & Company against Boyd J. Brown in the principal amounts of $218,986.42 
for trial attorney fees, $80,987.28 for appellate fees and $46,901.59 for post-appeal fees, for 
a total attorney fee award of $346,875.29. Accrued contract judgment interest at 10% per 
annum is awarded on the trial fees from October 18, 1990 ($137,632.96 as of February 1, 
1997). Pre-judgment interest of 10% per annum is awarded from February 3, 1995 on the 
appeal fees and post-appeal fees to the date of entry herein ($25,250.15 as of February 1, 1997), 
for a total judgment of $509,758.40 as of February 1, 1997. Judgment interest shall continue 
to accrue at the contract rate of 10% on the trial fee principal. Judgment interest on the 
principal appellate and post-appeal fees shall accrue at the contract rate from the date of entry 
herein. 
7. Based upon the court's post-appeal findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
defendants are awarded judgment against plaintiffs for costs in the amount of $235.00 filing fees, 
$955.00 witness fees, and $1,835.09 appellate costs, together with pre-judgment interest of 10% 
per annum from February 3, 1995 to February 1, 1997 of $605.02 for a total judgment in the 
amount of $3,630.11 as of February 1, 1997. Interest will accrue on the costs from the date of 
entry herein at the contract rate of 10% per annum. 
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OFFSET AND STAY 
1. The amounts awarded as judgment to the plaintiffs and defendants shall constitute 
an offset and the plaintiff Boyd J. Brown is awarded a net judgment against the defendants David 
K. Richards individually and David K. Richards & Company in the amount of $335,248.38 as 
of February 1, 1997. Any calculation of the net judgment on the date of entry herein or any 
date thereafter shall be made by calculating the principal and interest due under each judgment 
amount awarded herein, as of the date of calculation. 
2. All prior orders entered by the court staying execution of judgment are hereby 
vacated with the entry of this judgment. 
DATED this *2( day of /ItiOUtA 1997. 
BY THE COURT 
STEPHEN t^HENROID : 
Approved As To Form: 
okoM2j$y^ 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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